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Abstract—IoT platforms enable users to connect various smart
devices and online services via reactive apps running on the
cloud. These apps, often developed by third-parties, perform
simple computations on data triggered by external information
sources and actuate the results of computation on external
information sinks. Recent research shows that unintended or
malicious interactions between the different (even benign) apps
of a user can cause severe security and safety risks. These works
leverage program analysis techniques to build tools for unveiling
unexpected interference across apps for specific use cases. Despite
these initial efforts, we are still lacking a semantic framework
for understanding interactions between IoT apps. The question
of what security policy cross-app interference embodies remains
largely unexplored.
This paper proposes a semantic framework capturing the
essence of cross-app interactions in IoT platforms. The frame-
work generalizes and connects syntactic enforcement mechanisms
to bisimulation-based notions of security, thus providing a
baseline for formulating soundness criteria of these enforcement
mechanisms. Specifically, we present a calculus that models the
behavioral semantics of a system of apps executing concurrently,
and use it to define desirable semantic policies in the security
and safety context of IoT apps. To demonstrate the usefulness of
our framework, we define static mechanisms for enforcing cross-
app security and safety, and prove them sound with respect to
our semantic conditions. Finally, we leverage real-world apps to
validate the practical benefits of our policy framework.
Index Terms—Cloud-based IoT platform, IoT app security,
cross-app noninterference
I. INTRODUCTION
IoT platforms provide robust application support for au-
tomating the interaction and communication between Internet-
connected services and smart physical devices. This interaction
is enabled by simple reactive programs known as IoT apps
(or applets) running on a cloud-based IoT platform, and
sensing and actuating data from services and devices on
behalf of a user. These apps, often developed by third-parties,
are triggered by external information sources, as in “if the
room temperature exceeds a threshold”, to perform actions
on external information sinks, as in “open the windows”. By
exposing devices such as a thermostat and a smart window to
the IoT platform via, e.g., REST APIs, IoT apps can be used to
implement desirable automations like “if the room temperature
exceeds a threshold then open the windows”.
Driven by the appeal of end-user programming, IoT plat-
forms such as IFTTT [24] (If This Then That), Stringify [34],
and Microsoft Flow [29] support thousands of smart de-
vices and services with millions of users running millions
of IoT apps. These platforms help users to build powerful
automations by connecting IoT devices (e.g., smart homes,
security cameras, and voice assistants) to online services (e.g.,
Google and Dropbox) and social networks (e.g., Instagram
and Twitter). For instance, the IFTTT platform allows to
execute IoT applets that include triggers, actions, and filter
code. For the platform to run an applet, users need to provide
their credentials to the services associated with its triggers
and actions. In the previous applet that opens the window
when the temperature exceeds a threshold, the user gives
the applet access to the APIs for the temperature device
(e.g., a Nest Thermostat [32]) and the smart window (e.g.,
SmartThings [35]). Additionally, applets may contain filter
code for personalization, e.g., for setting the temperature
threshold. If present, the filter code is invoked after a trigger
has been fired and before an action is dispatched.
Recently, researchers have shown that popular IoT platforms
are susceptible to attacks that may cause severe security and
safety issues for the end users and the physical devices [5].
Examples of attacks include design flaws due to over privi-
leged permission tokens [18], unexpected information leaks by
seemingly harmless apps [36], and sensitive information dis-
closure by malicious apps [6], [11]. To protect the users against
these attacks, defensive mechanism rely on fine-grained access
control and capabilities, decentralization [19] or static [7], [11]
and dynamic [6] information-flow analysis.
A more subtle vulnerability concerns the unintended or
malicious interaction between different apps running on behalf
on the same user [13]–[15], [17], [36]. The distinctive feature
of IoT apps to affect a shared physical environment such
as the room temperature, may enable unintended cross-app
interactions between IoT apps that are installed by the same
user. For instance, in addition to the above-mentioned IoT app
“if the room temperature exceeds a threshold then open the
windows”, a user may also install the app “if I leave my work
location then turn on the thermostat at home”. While the user’s
intention is to use these two apps for separate purposes, the
interaction between the latter and the former may open the
window while the user is not at home, thus clearing a way for
burglary.
Recent research identifies numerous use cases of cross-
app interactions that violate specific policies, and suggests
tracking dependencies across IoT apps to identify policy vio-
lations [13]–[15], [17], [36]. These mechanisms perform inter-
application program analysis to track dependencies, and (man-
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ual or automatic) language processing to identify semantically-
related language constructs, e.g., the fact that temperature
and thermostat refer to related semantic constructs, despite
their syntax being different. While these approaches motivate
the need for analyzing security and safety risks in cross-app
interactions, foundational questions related to the interaction
semantics of apps, security policies, and soundness of enforce-
ment mechanisms remain largely unexplored.
This leads us to the following research questions: (i) What is
an appropriate formal model for cross-app interaction vulner-
abilities? (ii) Is there a generic policy framework for security
and safety that captures the essence of cross-app interactions?
(iii) How do we model implicit interactions stemming from
IoT-specific features like the physical environment? (iv) Can
we harden enforcement mechanisms to prove soundness guar-
antees in our policy framework?
Contributions: To help answering these questions, we
develop a process calculus for specifying and reasoning about
cross-app interactions, capturing the core features of apps in
IoT platforms like IFTTT and Stringify. We then propose
extensional conditions to capture the essence of security and
safety requirements in a system of IoT apps executing concur-
rently. We demonstrate the usefulness of these conditions by
considering policies from real-world apps, and discuss how
they can be relaxed in order to accommodate more flexible
user policies. Further, we show how standard enforcement
mechanisms can be adapted to check security and safety of a
system of IoT apps, thus providing strong guarantees against
vulnerable cross-app interactions. We think that these condi-
tions will provide a semantic baseline for proving soundness
of current and future enforcement mechanisms in the domain
of IoT apps.
Our key observation is that for a system of apps to reach an
unsafe configuration, a cross-app interaction should either lead
to an inconsistent state that violates the intended specification
for some apps, or engage in an interaction where the action
of one app triggers the execution of another app. This is
supported by the intuition, as well as existing real-world
vulnerabilities [13]–[15], [17], [36], that an end user may
consider a system of IoT apps as safe if the runtime behavior
of an app in isolation is bisimilar to running that app in
parallel with other apps in the system. Drawing on Focardi
and Martinelli’s Generalized Non Deducibility on Composi-
tion [21], we formalize this intuition to provide a bisimulation-
based characterization of safe cross-app interaction. Further,
we provide a simple syntactic condition and prove it sound
for our notion of safe cross-app interaction. We also tackle
the challenge of implicit cross-app interactions and propose
an extension of our semantic condition. Finally, we envision
scenarios where some form of interaction across apps can be
considered as safe, and show how it can be modeled in our
framework via priorities.
Further, we focus on confidentiality and integrity poli-
cies of a system of IoT apps and propose a termination-
insensitive bisimulation-based security condition that accom-
modates these policies. As standard in information-flow con-
trol [33], the condition assumes a security classification of
global services and devices, and it ensures that any interference
between apps respects the security classification. We propose
an extension of the flow-sensitive type system by Hunt and
Sands [23] for our concurrent IoT setting, and prove it sound
for our security condition.
In summary, the paper provides the following contributions:
• We present a calculus for IoT apps to study security
and safety in cross-app interactions. The calculus models
closely the behavioral semantics of apps in IoT platforms
(Section II).
• Inspired by policy requirements in real apps, we propose
an extensional condition for safe cross-app interactions,
as well as a syntactic condition to enforce safe interac-
tions (Section III).
• We extend our framework to accommodate implicit app
interactions and service priorities in order to tackle the
challenge of false negatives and false positives, respec-
tively (Section IV).
• We propose a flow-sensitive security types system, en-
forcing information-flow policies in a system of IoT apps
running concurrently (Section V).
Full proofs of our results and a number of examples of IoT
apps modeled in our calculus can be found in the Appendix.
II. A CALCULUS OF IOT APPS
In this section, we define our Calculus of IoT Apps, called
CaITApp, to formally specify and reason about systems of
apps, i.e., sets of concurrent IoT apps running on an IoT
platform, and accessing the Internet-connected services and
devices of a given user. The interface between the IoT apps
and the external services and physical devices, e.g., Dropbox
or home security camera, is defined by APIs that enable
communication between the platform and the user services and
devices. As common in IoT platforms like IFTTT, the platform
itself maintains a global store with data from a user’s services
and devices, which gets updated whenever there is a change
in the corresponding services and devices. Each IoT app of a
given user has its own local store, i.e., local view, which may
get updated whenever the execution of that app is triggered
by a change in the global store.
We start the description of our calculus with some prelim-
inary notations. We use letters x, y, z ∈ Service to denote the
IoT platform’s (global) view of a user’s services and devices.
Abusing notation, we call them just services in the following.
Values, ranged over by v, w ∈ Value are basic values, such
as booleans, integers, real numbers, strings, etc. We assume
two special values: ⊥ and ∗. The first represents an undefined
value, while the second is a placeholder that can be replaced
with “any value”.
The syntax of our systems is given by the grammar:
Sys  S ::= S ‖ S  parallel composition
| id[DP ]  app
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Here, id[D  P ] denotes an app with a unique identifier
id ∈ I, using only the global services declared in D, with
the associated permissions (read and/or write), and running
the process (code) P.
The syntax for service declarations is the following:
Decl  D ::= D;D  declaration list
| xR  service to be used in read
| xW  service to be used in write
In the following, we will write xRW, as an shorthand for xR; xW.
The syntax of our processes for describing the code running
in our IoT apps is the following:
Proc  P ::= listen(L)  listener
| x← e  set local store
| update(x)  set global store
| if b then {P} else {P}  conditional
| skip  termination
| X  process variable
| fixX •P  recursion
| P;P  seq. composition
Let us comment on the most peculiar constructs. With listen(L)
an app listens on a set of services L whose changes may trigger
the app to execute. This is a blocking construct as it progresses
only when at least one of the services listed in L changes. L
is formally defined as follows:
VarList  L ::= L; L  services list
| x  service
The construct x← e sets the local variable x (the local view of
the global service x) with the value obtained by the evaluation
of an expression e. Note that, in the expression e we may
have both readings on local variables y, simply denoted with
y, and readings of global variables y, denoted with read(y).
Thus, in the assignment x ← read(x) + y the local copy of
the service variable x is updated with the summation between
the up-to-date value of the global service x (taken from the
cloud) and the value read from the local copy of the service y.
The construct update(x) updates the value of the service x in
the global store with its current value in the local store. The
process fixX •P is the standard construct to denote recursion.
An app is a process silently running in background until
a trigger occurs. This latter fires the app payload, consist-
ing of a sequence of actions (potentially dispatched after
the execution of some code). Technically speaking, the pro-
cess running in an app is a recursive process of the form:
fixX • listen(L); payload. Intuitively, our apps keep listening
on a number of cloud services: when at least one these services
changes, the app executes its payload. The payload consists in
performing a number of activities, such as checking the state of
some cloud service x via the read(x) expression, and updating
one or more cloud services via the update(x) construct.
Actually, the syntax proposed for the code of our apps is
a bit too permissive with respect to our intentions. We could
rule out ill-formed apps with a simple type systems. However,
for the sake of simplicity, we prefer to provide the following
definition.
Definition 1 (Well-Formedness). An app id[DP ] is well-
formed if the following conditions are satisfied:
• P is of the form fixX • listen(L);Q;
• x appears in listen(L) only if xR occurs in D;
• the payload Q does not contain listeners;
• read(x) appears in Q only if xR occurs in D;
• update(x) appears in Q only if xW occurs in D.
A system is well-formed only if its apps are well-formed.
Hereafter, we will always work with well-formed systems.
Let us provide two simple examples to describe how we
can model IoT apps in CaITApp.
Example 1. Consider the following two apps. Tw2Fb reposts
on Facebook messages received on Twitter. Similarly, when
there is a new post on Facebook, the app Fb2Ld publishes the
post on LinkedIn. In this case, we have three logical services:
tw, for Twitter, fb, for Facebook and ld, for LinkedIn. The
apps are formalized in our language as follows:
Tw2Fb[ twR; fbWfixX • listen(tw); pld1 ]
where pld1
def
= tw← read(tw); fb← tw; update(fb);X, and
Fb2Ld[ fbR; ldWfixX • listen(fb); pld2 ]
where pld2
def
= ld← read(fb); ld← fb; update(ld);X.
Example 2. Consider the following two apps. When smoke
is detected, the app SmokeAlarm should fire the smoke alarm
and turn on the lights. If a given heat threshold is reached,
then the app Sprinks will open the water valve to activate
fire sprinkles. For that we assume five logical services: smoke,
reporting the presence of smoke, heat, reporting the heat level,
waterV, controlling the water valve, alarm, controlling the
smoke alarm, and lights, managing the lights. The apps are
formalized in our language as
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(StopListening)
L = x1; . . . ; xn ∃i ∈ [1, n] .G(xi) = φ(xi)
〈G, φ〉  listen(L) τ−→ 〈G, φ〉  skip
(SetLocal)
e(G, φ) = v
〈G, φ〉  x← e τ−→ 〈G, φ[x← v]〉  skip
(SkipUpdate)
G(x) = φ(x)
〈G, φ〉  update(x) τ−→ 〈G, φ〉  skip
(Update)
G(x) = φ(x) φ(x) = v
〈G, φ〉  update(x) x!v−−→ 〈G[x← v], φ〉  skip
(IfTrue)
b(G, φ) = tt
〈G, φ〉  if b then {P1} else {P2} τ−→ 〈G, φ〉  P1
(IfFalse)
b(G, φ) = ff
〈G, φ〉  if b then {P1} else {P2} τ−→ 〈G, φ〉  P2
(Fix)
−




〈G, φ〉  skip;P τ−→ 〈G, φ〉  P
(Seq)
〈G, φ〉  P1 λ−→ 〈G′, φ′〉  P′1
〈G, φ〉  P1;P2 λ−→ 〈G′, φ′〉  P′1;P2
TABLE I
LABELED TRANSITION SEMANTICS FOR PROCESSES
We end this section with a couple of notations and
abbreviations that will be used in the rest of the paper.
We will write update(x1, x2, . . . , xn) as an abbreviation for
the sequential update of the global variables x1, x2, . . . , xn,
namely: update(x1); update(x2); . . . ; update(xn). We write
if b then {P} as an abbreviation for if b then {P} else {skip}.
A. Labeled Transition Semantics
IoT Apps are simple applications interacting with physical
and logical services that can be accessed only via a cloud
platform, that we call global store, denoted with G ∈ S, where
S
def
= Service ⇀ Value is the set of all partial functions from
services to values. Every app id[DP ] retains a local view
of the cloud platform that must be consistent with the app’s
declaration D, meaning that the domain of the local store of id
consists of all and only those services declared in D. Changes
in the global store are shared with all parallel apps of the
system associated to the same user/account; however, these
modifications do not directly affect the apps’ local view of
the store. Indeed, a local store can be modified only explicitly
by its related app payload.
Since our syntax distinguishes between processes and sys-
tems of apps, in our labeled transition semantics we have two
different kinds of transitions: one for processes and a second
one for systems.
(App)
L(id) = φ 〈G, φ〉  P τ−→ 〈G, φ′〉  P′
〈G,L〉  id[DP ] τ− 〈G,L[id← φ′]〉  id[DP′ ]
(AppUpdate)
L(id) = φ 〈G, φ〉  P x!v−−→ 〈G′, φ〉  P′
〈G,L〉  id[DP ] id:x!v−−−− 〈G′,L〉  id[DP′ ]
(EnvChange)
−
〈G,L〉  S x?v−− 〈G[x← v],L〉  S
(ParLeft)
〈G,L〉  S1 α− 〈G′,L′〉  S′1 α ∈ {τ, id:x!v}
〈G,L〉  S1 ‖ S2 α− 〈G′,L′〉  S′1 ‖ S2
(ParRight)
〈G,L〉  S2 α− 〈G′,L′〉  S′2 α ∈ {τ, id:x!v}
〈G,L〉  S1 ‖ S2 α− 〈G′,L′〉  S1 ‖ S′2
TABLE II
LABELED TRANSITION SEMANTICS FOR SYSTEMS
In Table I we provide the transition rules for process
configurations of the form
〈G, φ〉  P λ−→ 〈G′, φ′〉  P′ ,
where G ∈ S denotes the global store while φ ∈ S is the
local store in which the process P is running. The labels
λ ∈ {τ, x!v} denote: nonobservable actions and observable
modifications (writings) of a global service x, respectively.
We assume a standard evaluation semantics for expressions
e ∈ S× S −→ Value, inductively defined on the structure of
the expression e. We omit the details of its definition. Here,
it is only important to notice that we have one expression for
looking-up variables in the local store, x(G, φ)
def
= φ(x), and




Now, let us comment on the most interesting rules of
Table I. The construct listen(L) is a blocking operator waiting
for changes in the cloud on (at least on of) those services
contained in L. The semantics of the listen(L) operator is for-
malized by means of the rule (StopListening). The transition rule
(SetLocal) serves to update the local store via an assignment to
(the local copy of the) service x; this assignment will affect
the global service x only if followed by an update(x). By
an application of the rule (Update) the construct update(x)
modifies the value associated to the service x in the global
store with the value recorded in the local store. The remaining
rules are standard.
In Table II we provide the transition rules for system
configurations of the form
〈G,L〉  S α−→ 〈G′,L′〉  S′ ,
where G ∈ S denotes the global store, whereas L ∈ I −→ S
is a map associating to any app identifier its local store. The
labels α ∈ {τ, id:x!v, x?v} denote: nonobservable actions,
observable modifications (writings) made by the applet id
on a global service x, and observable changes on a global
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service x made by the external environment, respectively. In
the following, we will write C
α−→ C′ to denote a transition
between system configurations belonging to the set Sconf of
all possible system configurations.
Now, let us comment on the transition rules of Table II. Both
rules (App) and (AppUpdate) serve to lift actions from processes
to apps (and hence systems of apps). Observe that in case of
updates on the cloud services, we are interested in annotating
the label of the action with the name of the app performing the
write operation; this will be useful when defining safe cross-
app interactions (Definition 3). The rule (EnvChange) models
changes in the cloud made by the external environment and
affecting all apps. Thus, this action is not triggered by some
app of the system and it can be fired nondeterministically at
any moment. Rules (ParLeft) and (ParRight) are standard. Note
that, for convenience, action x?v is allowed only to complete
systems as it does not propagate through parallel composition
(it is not admitted in rules (ParLeft) and (ParRight)).
III. DEFINING SAFE CROSS-APP INTERACTIONS
In order to capture harmful interactions in systems of apps,
we formalize a notion of safe cross-app interaction based on
a bisimulation-based behavioral semantics for our systems.
Intuitively, two apps may interact with each other by acting
on some common services in such a way that the state
reached by those services is somehow inconsistent (think of
a thermostat or a valve when activated by different apps
designed with different specifications in mind). However, this
is not the only way to yield unsafe interactions between two
apps: an app A might interact with a second app B if the
execution of some actions of A may affect services in the
cloud whose changes may subsequently trigger activities of B.
Those activities of B would not have been fired if A would
not have modified the state of its services on the cloud.
A. Semantic characterization of safe cross-app interactions
In this section, we provide a semantic characterization of
safe cross-app interaction based on some appropriate notion
of bisimulation.
Intuitively, we would like to say that a system of apps S does
not interact with a system R if the runtime behavior of R when
running in parallel with S does not differ from its behavior
when running in isolation. A bit more formally, along the lines
of Focardi and Martinelli’s Generalized Non Deducibility on
Composition (GNDC) [21], we would like to say that a system
S does not interact with a system R if
S ‖ R S R
for some appropriate bisimilarity S that hides those (ob-
servable) actions of S that modify the services in the cloud
(the global store). Notice that the bisimilarity S should only
suppress the capability of the observer to detect writing actions
on the cloud services executed by S; however, these writings
must be executed, so that indirect interactions via the cloud
between the two systems can be observed if they trigger a
nongenuine behavior in R.
Basically, in the scenario above, if bisimilarity breaks then
the system S does interact with the correct execution of R in
at least one of the following ways:
• The compound system S ‖ R might have nongenuine
traces containing observables (originating from the R
component) that cannot be reproduced by R in isolation;
here the interaction affects the integrity of the behavior
of R.
• The system R might have execution traces containing
observables that cannot be reproduced by the compound
system S ‖ R because they are prevented S; this is a
violation of the availability of the system R.
In order to formalize the concepts described above, we
define a slight generalization of the weak asynchronous bisim-
ulation [3] introduced for the asynchronous fragment of the
π-calculus [22], [28]. In that bisimulation, input actions are
made not observable because in an asynchronous setting the
observer cannot directly observe them. Here, we intend to hide
modifications on cloud enabled by the interacting system.
Consider a set H of hidden actions, H ⊂ A\{τ}, Then, the
following bisimulation compares two system configurations by
observing all possible actions except those occurring in H .
Definition 2 (Hiding Bisimulation). Given a set of actions
H ⊆ A\{τ}, the symmetric relation R ⊆ Sconf×Sconf is a
hiding bisimulation parametric on H if and only if, whenever
C1 R C2 and C1 α− C′1 we have the following:
• if α /∈ H then C2 α̂=⇒ C′2, for some C′2 such that C′1 R C′2;
• if α ∈ H then
– either C2
α̂
=⇒ C′2, for some C′2 such that C′1 R C′2
– or C2
τ−∗ C′2, for some C′2 such that C′1 R C′2.
We say that two system configurations C1 and C2 are hiding
bisimilar w.r.t. the set of actions H , written C1 ≈H C2, if
C1 R C2 for some hiding bisimulation R parametric on H .
Obviously, for H = ∅ we get the standard bisimulation.
In the following, for the sake of simplicity, given two system
configurations 〈G,L〉  S and 〈G,L〉  R, we will write
〈G,L〉  S ≈H R
as an abbreviation for 〈G,L〉  S ≈H 〈G,L〉  R.
Now, we can use our hiding bisimilarity to formalize a
semantic-based notion of safe cross-app interaction. As said
before, out intention is to hide only those actions that may





i=1 idi[DiPi ], we define the set of possible actions






{idi:x!v | xW ∈ Di} .
In the following, we let L⊥ be the function λid . λx .⊥ used
to define an initial local environments for all apps in which
all services are not initialized.
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Definition 3 (Safe cross-app interaction). Let S and R be two
systems of apps in CaITApp. We say that S is noninteracting
with R when
∀G ∈ S . 〈G,L⊥〉  S ‖ R ≈HS R ,
for HS
def
= upd(S). We say that the two systems S and R do
not interact with each other if in addition to the previous
requirement it holds that




Example 3. Consider the two apps Tw2Fb and Fb2Ld intro-
duced in Example 1. Here, we have a potentially unwanted
interaction between the two apps as Tw2Fb may trigger Fb2Ld:
a message of Twitter will be posted on Facebook by Tw2Fb,
then the app Fb2Ld will post that message on LinkedIn. In
fact, according to Definition 3, the app Tw2Fb may interact
with the app Fb2Ld as:
∃G ∈ S . 〈G,L⊥〉  Tw2Fb ‖ Fb2Ld ≈H Fb2Ld
for H = {Tw2Fb:tw!v | v ∈ Value}. It is easy to see that on
the left-hand-side compound system the app Fb2Ld might do
a writing on the cloud service LinkedIn that would not occur
if the app was running in isolation.
Example 4. Consider the two apps SmokeAlarm and Sprinks
introduced in Example 2. According to Definition 3, the two
apps do not interact with each other, as for any G ∈ S we
have the following:
• 〈G,L⊥〉  SmokeAlarm ‖ Sprinks ≈H1 SmokeAlarm,
with H1
def
= {Sprink:waterValve!v | v ∈ Value};




for any v ∈ Value.
In the example above the two apps do not interact with
each other simply because they work on different services.
However, according to Definition 3, two apps may be non-
interacting even if they write on the same services, provided
that no causalities exist among the two writings.
Example 5. Suppose to have an app SimPres that simulates
the presence of the user when it is not at home during the
night, turning on lights for 10 minutes every half an hour.
Then, consider a second app eSaver turning off lights during
the day to save energy whenever there is no motion for at least
5 minutes. The two apps are defined as follows:





if (0 < read(time.H) < 7 ∧ user = away) then {









if (8 < read(time.H) < 18) then {




Notice that that there is no interaction between these two
apps, even if they write on the same global service lights.
Actually, those writings occur in different periods of the day
and can never interact. Thus, according to Definition 3, for
any G ∈ S we have the following:
• 〈G,L⊥〉  SimPres ‖ eSaver ≈H1 eSaver, with H1 def=
{SimPres:lights!v | v ∈ Value};
• 〈G,L⊥〉  SimPres ‖ eSaver ≈H2 SimPres, with H2 def=
{eSaver:lights!v | v ∈ Value}.
B. A proof technique for safe cross-app interaction
Although the notion of safe cross-app interaction in Defini-
tion 3 is very intuitive, it is actually quite hard to verify due
to the universal quantification over all possible global stores.
In this section, we provide syntactic conditions, easy to
verify, that allow us to enforce the semantic condition of safe
cross-app interaction. In order to do that, we have to formally
specify: (i) what are the potential actions that an app may
perform, (ii) what are the services whose changes may trigger
an app.
In our calculus CaITApp, the actions potentially performed
by an app id[D  P ] are given by the services declared in
write modality.
Definition 4 (Actions). Given an app id[DP ], we define
act(id)
def
= {x ∈ Service | xW ∈ D}. More generally, in a








Similarly, the triggers of an app id[D  P ] are given by
the services on which the app currently listen or make a read
from the global store, namely the services declared in read
modality.
Definition 5 (Triggers). Given an app id[DP ], we define
trg(id)
def
= {x ∈ Service | xR ∈ D}. More generally, in a








Now, everything is in place to provide a syntactic condition
for safe cross-app interaction, where a system S is said not to
interact with a system R when:
• the two systems do not write on common cloud services;
• the execution of S may not trigger any app of R.
Formally,
Definition 6 (Syntax-based safe cross-app interaction). The
system S is said to be syntactically noninteracting with the
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system R, written S  R, when both the following conditions
hold:
1) act(S) ∩ act(R) = ∅;
2) act(S) ∩ trg(R) = ∅.
More generally, we say that the two systems S and R are
syntactically noninterfering w.r.t. each other, written S  R,
when besides the two conditions above it also holds:
3) trg(S) ∩ act(R) = ∅.
Now, if we consider the apps in Examples 1, 2 and 5, it is
easy to verify that:
• Fb2Ld  Tw2Fb holds;
• Tw2Fb  Fb2Ld does not hold because act(Tw2Fb) ∩
trg(Fb2Ld) = ∅;
• SmokeAlarm  Sprinks holds;
• SimPres  eSaver does not hold because they can
both modify the service lights, that is act(SimPres)∩
act(eSaver) = {lights} = ∅.
Thus, Definition 6 provides an easy-to-verify syntactic suf-
ficient condition for semantic-based condition.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). Let S and R be two systems of apps
in CaITApp. Let HS
def
= upd(S) and HR
def
= upd(R). Then:
• S  R implies ∀G ∈ S . 〈G,L⊥〉  S ‖ R ≈HS R;
• S  R implies
– ∀G ∈ S . 〈G,L⊥〉  S ‖ R ≈HS R
– ∀G ∈ S . 〈G,L⊥〉  S ‖ R ≈HR S.
The details of the proof can be found in the Appendix.
Obviously, Definition 6 provides us with a sufficient but
not necessary condition to derive soundness for cross-app
interactions, as shown, for instance, by the two apps SimPres
and eSaver in Example 5.
IV. IMPLICIT INTERACTIONS AND PRIORITIES
In this section, we study: (i) the challenge posed by im-
plicit cross-app interactions, and (ii) the possibility of having
priorities between different services.
The former arises whenever two services, e.g., temperature
and thermostat, are semantically related, though they differ
syntactically. This may lead to both the semantic condition
and the enforcement mechanism deeming an interaction as
safe, while this is not the case in practice. We propose an
extension of our language semantics, as well as a semantic
condition and a syntactic one to reason about such cases.
The latter may be useful when our semantic condition in
Definition 3 becomes too restrictive for use cases where the
end user is willing to accept some interactions on specific
services, e.g., social networks like Facebook, while avoiding
interactions on other services, e.g, the temperature. By lever-
aging a lattice order of priorities between services, we discuss
how our condition can be extended to enable such flexibility.
A. Countering implicit interactions
The semantic-based condition given in Definition 3 works
quite well when dealing with logical services like Facebook or
Twitter as in Example 1. However, when stepping to physical
services, i.e., services affecting the physical environment, such
as the temperature of a room, we may end up accepting as
safe a system of apps in the presence of some kind implicit
interactions. Consider the example below.
Example 6. Let Win be an app managing the window of
a room, depending on the temperature detected: when the
temperature is above 22 degrees then the window must be
opened. Formally,





if (temp > 22) then {win← Open; update(win)};
X
Now, suppose to have a second app Therm, managing the
thermostat of the room, such that when the temperature is
below 17 degrees the thermostat is set to rise the temperature
by 3 degrees. Formally,





if (temp < 17) then {therm← +3; update(therm)};
X
When running these two apps in parallel, we may have an
implicit interaction, as the app Therm may indirectly trigger
the app Win. This is because, we know, out of band, that the
temperature of the room should somehow change according
to the changes made on the thermostat of the room.
However, since this out-of-band information is not con-
sidered by our formalization, according to Definition 3 we
would have a kind of false negative as the app Therm is
not directly interacting with the app Wind. Formally, for
H
def
= upd(Therm) = {Therm:therm!v | v ∈ Value}, we have:
〈G,L⊥〉  Win ‖ Therm ≈H Win,
for any G ∈ S.
Note that causality dependencies between services, such
as those asserting that thermostat changes may affect the
temperature, are not part of the specification of an app (or of
a system of apps). This information comes from the physics
of the real system managed via apps. Thus, by no means we
can capture this kind of implicit interactions unless we have
information about causality dependencies.
However, we can assume that, when designing our system
of apps we actually get, out of band, a set of causality depen-
dencies to improve the precision of our analysis ruling out a
number of false negatives. For the sake of simplicity, we define
a dependency policy as a binary relation Δ ⊆ Service×Service
such that (x, y) ∈ Δ when the service y may be affected
by changes occurring at the service x. Clearly, dependencies
can be composed, hence we will consider the reflexive and
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transitive closure of Δ in order to capture all possible depen-
dencies associated to a service. We write clo(Δ, x) to denote
the reflexive and transitive closure of the dependency policy
Δ w.r.t. the service x. More generally, given a set of services
X ⊆ Service we define clo(Δ, X) def= ⋃x∈X clo(Δ, x).
Here, it is important to notice that when we act on the
thermostat of the room we actually do not know exactly
how the temperature will change (again, this depends on the
physics, e.g., on the wall isolation of the heated room). Thus,
the dependency policy Δ records only abstract information
relating pairs of services. More precisely, if (x, y) ∈ Δ we
may assume that each time the service x changes on the cloud
then the service y can be somehow affected. We represent this
abstract information by means of nondeterministic updates
assigning to y the special value ∗, meaning “any value”.
Ideally, the special value ∗ satisfies any boolean expression
containing it. For instance, ∗ ≤ n is true for any n.
Now, using this extra out-of-band information Δ on the
causality dependency between services, we can easily define
a labeled transitions semantics
α−→Δ, parametric on the set Δ:
• C1
α−→Δ C1 if C1 α− C1 is derived by an application of
any rule of Table I different from Update;
• rule Update is replaced by the following transition rule:
G(x) = φ(x) φ(x) = v clo(Δ, x) = {y1, . . . , yn}
〈G, φ〉  update(x) x!v−−→Δ 〈G[x← v, y1 ← ∗, . . . , yn ← ∗], φ〉  skip
Now, we can refine Definition 3 making it parametric on a
dependency policy Δ. Basically, we use our hiding bisimilarity
defined on top of the parametric LTS
α−→Δ, denoted with Δ≈H .
In this manner, we can rely on the dependency policy Δ
to capture false negatives due to implicit interactions: any
change on a service x affects any service in the set clo(Δ, x)
via nondeterministic assignments that will always trigger apps
listening at these services.
Definition 7 (Safe cross-app interaction under dependencies).
Let Δ be a dependency policy. Let S and R be two systems
of apps in CaITApp. We say that S is noninteracting with R
under Δ when
∀G ∈ S . 〈G,L⊥〉  S ‖ R Δ≈HS R
where HS
def
= upd(S). We say that the two systems S and R
do not interact with each other under Δ if in addition to the
requirement above we have




Now, in order to provide a consistent reformulation of The-
orem 1 to capture semantics-based noninteraction parametric
on a dependency policy Δ, we have to reformulate Definition 6
to take into account the presence of the dependency policy.
Definition 8 (Syntax-based safe cross-app interaction under
dependencies). Let Δ be a dependency policy. The system S
is said to be syntactically noninteracting under Δ with the
system R, written S
Δ
 R, when both the following conditions
hold:
1) act(S) ∩ act(R) = ∅;
2) clo(Δ, act(S)) ∩ trg(R) = ∅.
More generally, we say that the two systems S and R are
syntactically noninteracting w.r.t. each other under Δ, written
S
Δ
 R, when besides the two conditions above we also have:
3) trg(S) ∩ clo(Δ, act(R)) = ∅.
Now, if we consider the apps in Example 6 with Δ =
{(therm, temp)} we have:
• Win Δ Therm holds;
• Therm Δ Win does not hold because trg(Win) =
{temp}, clo(Δ, act(Therm)) = {therm, temp} and hence
clo(Δ, act(Therm)) ∩ trg(Win) = ∅.
Finally, we can reformulate Theorem 1 to prove that Defini-
tion 8 provides a sufficient condition to capture semantic-based
noninteraction under a given dependency policy Δ.
Theorem 2 (Soundness under dependencies). Let Δ be a
dependency policy. Let S and R be two systems of apps in
CaITApp. Let HS
def
= upd(S) and HR
def
= upd(R). Then:
• S Δ R implies ∀G ∈ S . 〈G,L⊥〉  S ‖ R Δ≈HS R;
• S Δ R implies
– ∀G ∈ S . 〈G,L⊥〉  S ‖ R Δ≈HS R
– ∀G ∈ S . 〈G,L⊥〉  S ‖ R Δ≈HR S.
The details of the proof can be found in the Appendix.
Thanks to Theorem 2, for Δ = {(therm, temp)}, we can
now correctly capture the semantic-based interaction between
the apps of Example 6 as there is G ∈ S such that
〈G,L⊥〉  Win ‖ Therm ≈H Win
for H
def
= upd(Therm) = {Therm:therm!v | v ∈ Value}.
B. Increasing flexibility via priorities
We envision use cases where users are aware of potential
interactions on some services, while disallowing interactions
on other services. For instance, an app managing the fire alarm
may have higher priority than an app posting messages to
Facebook. This relative importance of services can be specified
with a lattice of service priorities. Suppose to have a priority
policy Π, which associates a priority level p, taken from some
complete lattice 〈PL,〉, with each service used by our system
of apps.
Now, we can extend our condition of hiding bisimilarity to
define safety of cross-app interference up to a given priority
level. In fact, given a priority level p, we can formally ensure
that two systems have the same behaviour only when looking
at observables on services at priority level greater than, or
equal to p.
Definition 9 (Safe cross-app interaction up to priorities). Let
S and R be two systems of apps in CaITApp. We say that S
is noninteracting with R up to the priority level p when:
∀G ∈ S . 〈G,L⊥〉  S ‖ R ≈Hp R
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where Hp
def
= upd(S) ∪ {id:x!v ∈ upd(R) | p  Π(x)}.
Note that when Π maps each service to the same priority
level, the definition above coincides with Definition 3. To
enforce the condition above, we can easily define a syntax-
based condition similar to the one given in Definition 6.
V. SECURING CROSS-APP INTERACTIONS
It is not hard to imagine that services accessed via an IoT
platform may have different security clearance. For instance,
a service to access a smart security camera should definitely
not leak any kind of information to a second service that is
used to share nice pictures among friends.
In this section, we assume a security policy Σ, which
associates a security level σ, taken from some complete lattice
〈SL,〉, with each service used by our system of apps. For
the sake of simplicity, in the examples, the security levels
will simply be high (H), or secret, and low (L), or public,
although the theory is developed for a generic complete
lattice 〈SL,〉, of security levels. The goal is to achieve
classical noninterference results stating that a system of apps
is interference-free if its low-level services are not affected by
changes occurring at its high-level services. Thus, information
can safely flow from a service x to a service y whenever
Σ(x)  Σ(y). In the following, we use ≺ to denote the
nonreflexive restriction of  (i.e., δ ≺ σ iff δ  σ and δ = σ).
As usual, a security policy induces an equivalence relation
between stores. Given two (global) stores G,G′ ∈ S, we say
that they are σ-equivalent, written G ≡σ G′, if they agree on
the values associated to all services with security level lower
than, or equal to, σ.
Definition 10 (σ-equivalent stores). Let G,G′ ∈ S be two
stores and σ ∈ SL be a security level. We say that G and G′
are σ-equivalent, written G ≡σ G′, whenever:
∀x ∈ Service .Σ(x)  σ ⇒ G(x) = G′(x) .
Now, we can formalize a bisimulation-based notion of
noninterference parametric on some security level σ ∈ SL.
Intuitively, the runtime behavior at security level σ (or lower)
of an interference-free system does not change when executed
in two different σ-equivalent stores G and G′, though it may
differ on services with security clearance higher than σ. Actu-
ally, in our notion of noninterference we consider σ-equivalent
stores in S⊥
def
= {G ∈ S | ∀x ∈ dom(G) .G(x) = ⊥}, as
the mere initialization of an high-level service might activate
a listener in an applet, thus leaking information about the
occurrence/presence of a high event. We ignore presence
leaks in order to increase premissivenes of our enforcement
mechanism.
Our general notion of hiding bisimilarity can be used to
hide (but not to suppress) actions involving changes affecting
high-level services. In the following, with an abuse of notation,
we extend Σ to assign security levels to system actions α,
according to the cloud services affected by α. Thus, we define
Σ(id:x!v) = Σ(x) and Σ(α) = ⊥ for α ∈ {τ, x?v}.1
However, in order to capture a semantic notion of non-
interference that is not sensitive to information leaks due
to program termination2 we propose a modification of our
hiding bisimilarity inspired by the termination-insensitive i-
bisimulation proposed by Demange and Sands [16]. For this
purpose, given a set of hidden actions H , we will write C1 ⇑H
if and only if C1 ∈ D def= {C : (∃α ∈ A.C α− C′) ∧ (C α−
C′ ⇒ α ∈ H ∪ {τ} ∧ C′ ∈ D)}, that is C1 belongs to the
set of high-level divergent configurations that can always and
only perform either τ -actions or high-level actions.
Definition 11 (Termination-Insensitive Hiding Bisimulation).
Given a set of actions H ⊆ A \ {τ}, the symmetric relation
R ⊆ Sconf × Sconf is a termination-insensitive hiding bisim-
ulation parametric on H if and only if, whenever C1 R C2
and C1
α− C′1 we have the following:
• if α /∈ H then
– either C2
α̂
=⇒ C′2, for some C′2 such that C′1 R C′2
– or C2 ⇑H
• if α ∈ H then
– either C2
α̂
=⇒ C′2, for some C′2 such that C′1 R C′2
– or C2
τ−∗ C′2, for some C′2 such that C′1 R C′2.
We say that two system configurations C1 and C2 are
termination-insensitive hiding bisimilar w.r.t. the set of actions
H , written C1 ≈tiH C2, if C1 R C2 for some termination-
insensitive hiding bisimulation R parametric on H .
Definition 12 (σ-level noninterference). Let S be a system of
apps and Hσ
def
= {α ∈ A | Σ(α)  σ} the set of actions with
clearance greater than σ. We say that S is σ-level interference-
free whenever:
∀G,G′ ∈ S⊥ .G ≡σ G′ ⇒ 〈G,L⊥〉  S ≈tiHσ 〈G′,L⊥〉  S .
Example 7. Consider the classic two-points lattice {L,H},
used for the system of apps S
def
= Tw2Fb ‖ Fb2Ld of Example 1
such that: Σ(tw) = Σ(fb) = H and Σ(ld) = L. Obviously,
the compound system is exposed to a security interference, as
confidential information posted on tw will flow into the public
service ld. In fact, it is not hard to find two L-equivalent global
stores G and G′ such that 〈G,L⊥〉  S ≈tiHL 〈G′,L⊥〉  S. This
would not be the case if it was Σ(ld) = H. In that case, the
bisimilarity would hold for any pair of L-equivalent stores.
Again, Definition 12 has a universal quantification on two
global environments and then it requires the verification of a
nontrivial bisimilarity. So, its verification is hard to achieve.
In order to provide a syntactic sufficient condition for
security noninterference we resort to a type system, parametric
in the security policy Σ, and inspired by the flow-sensitive
1We recall that the action x?v is not “originating” from our system but it
denotes a modification of the service x made by the external environment.
2Termination leaks have well-known information-theoretic bounds [4], and
they are usually ignored in order to increase permissiveness for static analysis
that do not consider for program termination.
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Typing rules for expressions
(Var)
Γ(x) = σ
Γ  x : σ
(Read)
Σ(x) = σ
Γ  read(x) : σ
(Expr)
Γ  e1 : σ1 Γ  e2 : σ2
Γ  e1 op e2 : σ1  σ2





Γ  e : σ
pc  Γ{x← e}Γ[x → σ  pc]
(Fix)
pc  Γ{P}Γ′













































pc  id[DP ]
(Par)
pc  S1 pc  S2














security type system of Hunt and Sands [23], adapted to our
setting. In Table III we provide the typing rules.
Intuitively, a judgment of the form pc  S says that the
system S does not contain information flows from services at
security level higher than pc to services at security level lower
than or equal to pc. Here, pc denotes the usual “program
counter” level and serves to eliminate indirect information
flows. We write  S to denote pc  S when pc is the least
security level, i.e., the bottom element of the lattice SL.
Since the syntax of our calculus is in two levels we also
have a different kind of judgments for processes running inside
an app: pc  Γ{P}Γ′. Here, as in Hunt and Sands [23], Γ
describes the security levels of services which hold before
execution of P while Γ′ describe the security level of those
services after execution of P. Again, pc denotes the “program
counter” level and the derivation rules ensure that only services
which end up (in Γ′) with types greater than or equal to pc
may be changed by P.
Here, we wish to remark that, unlike batch-job noninterfer-
ence models [37], a security information flow occurs in our
setting only if a low-level service x is subject to an information
flow and then x is “published” within the same app on the
cloud via an update construct. In fact, the update operator is the
only “exit gate” for potential (direct or indirect) information
flows created within an app. This requires some care in the
definition of the typing rule (Update). Basically, we impose
that the update of a global service x is possible only if x is
associated to an “original” security level (given by Σ) higher
than or equal to the security level derived by its use (given
by Γ) in the previous instructions within the app. On the
other hand, we consider harmless those information flows that
remain confined within an app because no update publishes
their effects; this situations will not be ruled out by our type
system. Finally, notice the difference between the two typing
rules (Var) and (Read) as they serve for typing accesses to local
views of services and global services, respectively.
As expected, system (and process) well-typedness is pre-
served at runtime.
Proposition 1 (Subject reduction). Let Σ be a security policy,
S a system of apps, and σ ∈ SL a security level. If pc  S
and 〈G,L〉  S α− 〈G′,L′〉  S′ then pc  S′.
Subject reduction is a crucial ingredient to prove that well-
typedness is a sufficient condition to ensure noninterference.
Theorem 3 (Soundness of security types). Let Σ be a security
policy, S a system of apps and Hσ
def
= {α ∈ A | Σ(α)  σ}
the set of all possible high-level actions. If  S then
∀G,G′ ∈ S⊥ .G ≡σ G′ ⇒ 〈G,L⊥〉  S ≈tiHσ 〈G′,L⊥〉  S .
Proof. (Sketch) The proof proceeds by contradiction. Consider
two configurations C
def
= 〈G,L⊥〉  S and C′ def= 〈G′,L⊥〉  S
for some well-typed system S, and differing for two σ-
equivalent global stores G and G′, respectively. If C and
C′ are not bisimilar then whenever we try to build up a
termination-insensitive hiding bisimulation R containing the
pair (C,C′), the bisimulation game will stop in a pair of
configurations (Ci,C
′
i), with Ci (resp., C
′
i) derivative of C
(resp., C′), such that Ci can perform some action α that cannot
be (weakly) mimicked by C′i (or vice versa). Since both Ci
and C′i are derivatives of well-typed configurations (actually
well-typed systems), by subject reduction (Proposition 1) the
corresponding systems are both well-typed.
Now, since our termination-insensitive hiding bisimilarity
neglects high-level actions, by a case analysis on the dis-
tinguishing action α, the only possibility is that α denotes
the update of a low-level service derived by the evaluation of
some high-level service, the only ones on which the two global
stores may differ. But this would lead to a security information
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flow that is prevented by the type systems as both Ci and C
′
i
are well-typed. Thus, this action is not admissible.
As a consequence, since there are no distinguishing system
actions α, the two original configurations C and C′ must be
bisimilar.
Full details of the proof can be found in the Appendix.
Example 8. Let us show that system S of Example 7 is
cannot be typed in our type system. The process P run-
ning inside the applet Tw2Fb is typable: L  Γ{P}Γ, for
Γ = [tw → H , fb → H , ld → L]. As a consequence,
the app is typable as well:  Tw2Fb[ twR; fbW  P ]. On the
other hand, the process Q running within the applet Fb2Ld
is not typable. In fact, when building the derivation tree for
the typing, we have to type the assignment ld ← fb as
L  Γ1
{
ld← fb}Γ2, for Γ1 = [tw → H , fb → H , ld → L]
and Γ2 = [tw → H , fb → H , ld → H]. But then, the
subsequent update update(ld) cannot be typed, since the
current typing of ld is H while the initial typing of ld is
Σ(id) = L. Thus, the app Fb2Ld[ fbR; ldWQ ] is not typable
and, in turn, the parallel composition S is not typable.
We remark that our security type system did not face
any permissiveness issues (i.e., false positives) for the apps
considered in the paper. We expect our analysis to scale well
and produce a minimal false-positive rate for user-automation
IoT platforms like IFTTT and Stringify. In these platforms,
the code consist of simple snippets matching the syntax of
CaITApp closely [6]. For other IoT platforms like Smart-
Things, the code can be more complex (in fact, SmartThings
apps are implemented in Groovy), hence our analysis would
face classical challenges for type-based approaches due to
complex language features, e.g., aliasing.
VI. RELATED WORK
Security and safety risks in the IoT domain have been
the subject of a large array of research studies. We refer
to recent surveys for an overview of the area [2], [5], [12].
Here, we compare our contributions with closely related works
on security and safety analysis of IoT apps, information-flow
control, and formal models for IoT.
Securing IoT apps: Recent research points out the se-
curity and safety risks arising in the context of IoT apps.
Surbatovich et al. [36] study a dataset of 20K IFTTT ap-
plets and provide an empirical evaluation of potential secrecy
and integrity violations, including violations due to cross-
app interactions. Celik et al. [13], [14] propose static and
dynamic enforcement mechanisms for unveiling cross-app in-
terference vulnerabilities. Ding et al. [17] propose a framework
that combines device physical channel analysis and static
analysis to generate all potential interaction chains among
applications in an IoT environment. They leverage natural
language processing to identify services that have similar
semantics, and propose a risk-based approach to classify the
actual risks of the discovered interaction chains. Chi et al. [15]
propose a systematic categorization of threats arising from
unintentional or malicious interaction of apps in IoT platforms.
To detect cross-app interference, they use symbolic execution
techniques to analyze the apps’s implementation. Nguyen et
al. [31] design IoTSan, a system that uses model checking
to reveal cross-app interaction flows. All the above-mentioned
works provide an excellent motivation for our foundational
contributions. Our policy framework can be used to validate
soundness and permissiveness of these verification techniques.
Another line of work focuses on enforcement mechanisms
for checking security and safety of single IoT apps. Fernandes
et al. [18] present FlowFence, an approach building secure
IoT apps via information-flow tracking and controlled declas-
sification. Celik et al. [11] leverage static taint tracking to
identify sensitive data leaks in IoT apps. Bastys et al. [6],
[7] identify new attack vectors in IFTTT applets and show
that 30% of applets from their dataset can be subject to
such attacks. As a countermeasure, they investigate static and
dynamic information-flow tracking via security types. Fernan-
des et al. [19] propose the use of decentralization and fine-
grained authentication tokens to limit privileges and prevent
unauthorized actions. In contrast, our work targets security and
safety issues in cross-app interactions, and it focuses on the
formal underpinnings of these approaches.
Information-flow control: Several works propose
information-flow control for enforcing confidentiality and
integrity policies in emerging domains like IoT. We refer to
a survey by Focardi and Gorrieri [20] for an overview on
information-flow properties in process algebra. Our semantic
condition of safe cross-app interaction draws inspiration
from Focardi and Martinelli’s notion of Generalized Non
Deducibility on Composition (GNDC) [21], applied along the
lines of [27]. Volpano and Smith [37] study a flow-insensitive
type system for imperative languages. Because in our
language the communication betweeen services is handled
via explicit update statements, a flow-insensitive type system
would be too restrictive and reject more secure programs.
Hunt and Sands [23] propose a flow-sensitive type system for
an imperative language. Our work extends their type system
to ensure security for a system of apps running concurrently.
Similarly to our definition of termination-insensitive hiding
bisimulation, Demange and Sands [16] propose a weakening
of low bisimulation conditions to ignore leaks arising from
program termination. In contrast, the execution of our app’s
payload affects the global store via a well-defined interface,
i.e., listeners and update statements, which makes our systems
of apps more amenable for enforcing security and safety
properties.
There are a few approaches that carry out information-
flow analysis on discrete/continuous models for cyber-physical
systems. Akella et al. [1] proposed an approach to perform
information flow analysis, including both trace-based analysis
and automated analysis through process algebra specifica-
tions. This approach has been used to verify process algebra
models of a gas pipeline system and a smart electric power
grid system. Wang [38] propose Petri-net models to verify
nondeducibility security properties of a natural gas pipeline
system. More recently, Bohrer and Platzer [10] introduce dHL,
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a hybrid logic for verifying cyber-physical hybrid-dynamic
information flows, communicating information through both
discrete computation and physical dynamics, ensuring security
in presence of attackers that observe continuously-changing
values in continuous time.
Formalizing IoT semantics: IoT semantics has been sub-
ject to several works aiming at capturing subtle IoT-specific
notions like time and device state. Newcomb et al. [30]
propose IOTA, a calculus for the domain of home automation.
Based on the core formalism of IOTA, the authors develop
an analysis for detecting whenever an event can trigger two
conflicting actions, and an analysis for determining the root
cause of (non)occurrence of an event. Lanese et al. [25]
propose a calculus of mobile IoT devices interacting with the
physical environment by means of sensors and actuators. The
calculus does not allow any representation of the physical
environment, while it is equipped with an end-user bisimi-
larity in which end-users may: (i) provide values to sensors,
(ii) check actuators, and (iii) observe the mobility of smart
devices. End-user bisimilarity is not preserved by parallel
composition. Compositionality is recovered by strengthening
its discriminating power. Lanotte and Merro [26] extend and
generalize the work of [25] in a timed setting by provid-
ing a bisimulation-based semantic theory that is suitable for
compositional reasoning. Bodei et al. [9] propose an untimed
process calculus, IoT-LYSA, supporting a control flow analysis
that safely approximates the abstract behavior of IoT systems.
Essentially, they track how data spread from sensors to the
logic of the network, and how physical data are manipulated.
The calculus adopts asynchronous multi-party communication
among nodes taking care of node proximity. The dynamics of
the calculus is given in terms of a reduction relation. In [8], the
same authors extend their work to infer quantitative measures
to establish the cost of possibly security countermeasures, in
terms of time and energy. In contrast, our calculus models
constructs that are relevant for our security and safety analysis
of cross-app interactions in IoT platforms, while ignoring
details of the physical environment.
VII. CONCLUSION
IoT platforms empower users by connecting a wide array
of otherwise unconnected services and devices. These plat-
forms routinely execute IoT apps that have access to sensitive
information of their users. Because different apps of a user
may affect a common physical or logical environment, their
interaction (even for benign apps) can cause severe security
and safety risks for that user.
Motivated by this setting, we proposed a generic foun-
dational framework for securing cross-app interactions. We
presented an extensional condition that captures the essence
of safe cross-app interactions, as well as implicit interactions
and priorities. Moreover, we studied an extensional condition
for confidentiality and integrity properties of a system of apps,
and proposed a flow-sensitive security type system to enforce
such condition.
Because of the simplicity of the execution model and the
relatively-small code size, IoT apps offer a promising avenue
for integrating formal techniques studied by the community to
real-world products. In future work, we plan to implement our
techniques for IoT platforms like Android Things and Node-
RED, and investigate their impact on users’ security and safety.
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Proof of Theorem 1. It suffices to prove the first part of the
theorem (for the second part, just swap S with R). Assume
S  R, i.e., act(S) ∩ act(R) = ∅ = act(S) ∩ trg(R),
then we have to prove that for any global store G we have:
〈G,L⊥〉  S ‖ R ≈HS R, with HS = upd(S). The proof is by
contradiction.
Suppose S and R be two syntactically noninteracting sys-
tems such that 〈G,L⊥〉  S ‖ R ≈HS R. By definition of
bisimulation, this means that whenever we try to build up
a hiding bisimulation R containing the pair (C,C′), with
C
def
= 〈G,L⊥〉  S ‖ R and C′ def= 〈G,L⊥〉  R, the bisimulation
game will stop with a pair of configurations (Ci,C
′
i), with Ci
(resp., C′i) derivative of C (resp., C
′), where Ci can perform
an action α that cannot be (weakly) mimicked by C′i (or vice
versa).
Let proceed by case analysis on the action α that would
distinguish the two configurations.
– α = τ . We notice that τ -actions cannot distinguish the
two systems as we adopted a weak notion of bisimulation.
– α = x?v. This action can be only derived by an
application of rule (EnvChange) in Table II. However, as
already pointed out, this action denotes a modification of the
cloud made by the external observer. Thus, this action does
not depend on the actual configuration and can always be
performed by both configurations.
– α = id:x!v. We have two sub-cases.
• id is an applet of the system S. In this case, α ∈ HS,
and by definition of hiding bisimulation this action can
always be mimicked by an arbitrary number (possibly 0)
of τ -actions.
• id is an applet of the system R. In this case, α /∈ HS. As
α is the distinguishing action, it follows that the app id
reaches different states in the two configurations Ci and
C′i leading to two possible situations: (i) the writing on
x is possible in Ci but not in C
′
i; (ii) the writing on x is
possible in both configurations but with different values.
Since both S ‖ R and R start in the same global store (the
local store is not initialized in both cases), the system
R could exhibit different behaviors if and only if it is
affected by S. In particular, it means that S must modify
a service that R listens on, or a service that R reads from
the global store. Recall that there is no direct information
passing between applets, so the only way for applets to
interact is via the global store. However, we assumed
that act(S)∩ trg(R) is empty, hence this situation is not
possible.
As it does not exist a distinguishing action α, it follows that
the original configurations C and C′ must be hiding bisimilar,
with HS = upd(S).
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof goes along the same lines of
that of Theorem 1. Indeed, the setting of the bisimulation is
the same but the syntactic condition is stronger than the one of
Theorem 1: act(S) ⊆ clo(Δ, act(S)) and the relation Δ (see
Definition 8) is more restrictive than  (see Definition 6).
Now, let us provide a technical lemma which is useful to
prove the subject reduction property of the type system defined
in Table III.
Lemma 1. Let Σ be a security policy, P a process, and σ ∈ SL




Γ2 and 〈G, φ〉P λ−→ 〈G′,L′〉





Proof. The proof is by rule induction on the transitions rules
defining the semantics of processes (Table I). In that table, all
transition rules are axioms (base cases of the induction) except
for the rule (Seq) (the only inductive case). Let us proceed by
case analysis on
〈G, φ〉  P λ−→ 〈G′, φ′〉  P′.
We examine the most significant cases.
• Rule (SetLocal). In this case, we have P = x ← e, P′ =
skip, Γ1  e : δ, for some δ, and Γ2 = Γ1[x → δ  σ].
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application of the typing rule (Skip).
• Rule (Update). In this case, we have P = update(x),
P′ = skip, Σ(x) = δ, for some δ, Γ1  x : δ′, for some
δ′  δ and Γ1 = Γ2. Then, setting Γ′1 = Γ1 = Γ2, we




Γ2 by an application of the typing
rule (Skip).
• Rule (IfTrue). In this case, P = if b then {P1} else {P2},
P′ = P1 and Γ1  b : δ, for some δ. Then, by definition





Γ2, for some Γ
′
1. Finally, since σ  σ  δ, by














Γ2, 〈G, φ〉  P1 λ−→ 〈G′′, φ′′〉  P′1 and
P′ = P′1;P2. Since the derivation tree for 〈G, φ〉 P1 λ−→
〈G′′, φ′′〉  P′1 is smaller than the derivation tree for

























Proof of Proposition 1. Given a security policy Σ, a system
of apps S and a security level σ ∈ SL, we have to prove that
if σ  S and 〈G,L〉  S α− 〈G′,L′〉  S′ then σ  S′.
The proof is by rule induction on the transitions rules
defining the semantics of systems (Table II). We proceed by
case analysis on why
〈G,L〉  S α− 〈G′,L′〉  S′.





Γ2, 〈G,L(id)〉  P α−→ 〈G′,L′(id)〉  P′ and S′ =
id[D P′ ]. By an application of Lemma 1, we derive




λ2, for some Γ
′
1. By an application of
the typing rule (App) we derive σ  S′.
• Rule (AppUpdate). Similar to the previous case.
• Rule (EnvChange). In this case, S = S′ and we trivially
have σ  S′.
• Rule (ParLeft). In this case, we have S = S1 ‖ S2, 〈G,L〉
S1
α− 〈G′′,L′′〉S′1, σ  S1 and S′ = S′1 ‖ S2. Since the
derivation tree for 〈G,L〉S1 α− 〈G′′,L′′〉S′1 is smaller
than the derivation tree for 〈G,L〉S α− 〈G′,L′〉S′, and
σ  S1, by inductive hypothesis it follows that σ  S′1.
Thus, by an application of the typing rule (Par) it follows
that σ  S′1 ‖ S2.
• Rule (ParRight). Similar to the previous case.
Proof of Theorem 3. Assume that  S and G ≡σ G′, then
we have to prove that 〈G,L⊥〉  S ≈tiHσ 〈G′,L⊥〉  S, with
Hσ = {α ∈ A | Σ(α)  σ}. The proof is by contradiction.
Suppose there exist two stores G,G′ ∈ S⊥ such that
G ≡σ G′ and 〈G,L⊥〉 S ≈tiHσ 〈G′,L⊥〉 S. This implies that
whenever we try to build up a termination-insensitive hiding
bisimulationR containing the pair (C,C′), with C def= 〈G,L⊥〉
S and C′ def= 〈G′,L⊥〉  S, the bisimulation game will stop in
a pair of configurations (Ci,C
′
i), with Ci (resp., C
′
i) derivative
of C (resp., C′), where Ci can perform an action α that cannot
be (weakly) mimicked by C′i (or vice versa). Since both Ci
and C′i are derivatives of well-typed configurations (actually
well-typed systems), by subject reduction (Proposition 1) the
corresponding systems are both well-typed.
Let proceed by case a analysis on the action α that would
distinguish the two configurations.
– α = τ . We notice that τ -actions cannot be a problem
as we adopted a weak notion of bisimulation which can also
mimic τ -actions.
– α = x?v. This action can be only derived by an
application of rule (EnvChange) in Table II. However, as
already pointed out, this action denotes a modification of the
cloud made by the external observer. Thus, this action does
not depend on the actual configuration and can always be
performed by both configurations.
– α = id:x!v. We have two sub-cases.
• Σ(x)  σ. That is α is a high-level action. In this case,
α ∈ Hσ , and by definition of our bisimulation this action
can always be mimicked by an arbitrary number (possibly
0) of τ -actions.
• Σ(x)  σ. That is α is a low-level action, or more pre-
cisely an action with security level smaller than or equal
to σ. As α is the distinguish action, it follows that the
app id reaches different states in the two configurations
Ci and C
′
i leading to two possible situations: (i) the low-
level writing on x is possible in Ci but not in C
′
i; (ii) the
low-level writing on x is possible in both configurations
but with different values.
Let us consider the case (i) first. Since the initial global
stores are σ-equivalent, G ≡σ G′, and potential updates
of the global stores via the transition rule (EnvChange)
will update the two stores consistently, it follows that
Gi ≡σ G′i, where Gi (resp., G′i) is the global store of
Ci (resp., C′i). Thus, one possibility for the app id to
reach two different states in the configurations Ci and
C′i, such that Ci performs the update and C
′
i does not
perform the update (or vice versa), is that it passed by a
conditional statement that was evaluated differently in the
two cases. Since Gi ≡σ G′i, it follows that the guard of
the conditional involved some high-level services which
are the only ones that can differ in the two global stores.
However, this situation is prevented by our type system
as the typing rule (IfElse) ensures that we cannot have
low-level updates in the two branches of the conditional,
after the evaluation of a high-level guard (the high-level
type is pushed into the pc of the branches and, eventually,
to the low-level update). The other possibility is that there
was a conditional statement that was evaluated differently
in the two configurations: one branch diverges (without
performing any low update) while the other does not.
Then, after the conditional we have a low-level update.
But in this case the two configurations are bisimilar, by
definition of our termination-insensitive bisimulation.
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Let us consider now the case (ii), i.e. when the low-level
writing on x is possible in both configurations Ci and
C′i but with different values v and v
′, respectively. This
situation would be possible when the writing on x in the
app id is preceded by an assignment x ← e and the
evaluations of e in the two configurations leads to v and
v′, respectively, with v = v′. Since Gi ≡σ G′i it follows
that the expression e must have a high-level security type,
that is, Γ  e : δ, with σ ≺ δ.
A similar situation would be possible also if there was
a conditional whose guard is typed at high-level and the
service x is assigned in both branches of the conditional
(with different values v and v′). Here, x would take
different values even if the assignments involve only low-
level expressions, since the guard has type greater than
σ, similarly to what happens in case (i). However, our
type system would type x as δ  σ and, via the typing
rule (Update), it does not admit low-level writings on x
as Σ(x)  σ ≺ δ = Γ(x). Thus, also this case is not
admissible.
As it does not exist a distinguishing action α, it follows that
the original configurations C and C′ must be bisimilar, with
Hσ = {α ∈ A | Σ(α)  σ}.
B. Further examples of IoT apps
In the following, we provide further examples of apps that
can be modeled in our calculus CaITApp. These examples
are inspired by existing real-world apps, also studied in the
literature.
Example 9. Consider an app with the following specification.
When the user enters a given geographical area the app sends
an e-mail saying “entering area”. Similarly, when the user exits
the given area, the app sends an e-mail saying “exiting area”.
Suppose a services gps reporting the current position of the
user in terms of gps coordinates: gps.Lat and gps.Long. Sup-
pose also a service emailA, sending e-mails to a given address.
The geographical area is given by a center, with coordinates
centerLat and centerLong, and a radius called side. The area
is the square with edges 〈centerLat±side, centerLong±side〉.
The app is:




= if (ExitArea) then {
emailA← goingOut; update(emailA)
} else {







where ExitArea is a macro for the boolean test:
gps.Lat− centerLat ≤ side∧
gps.Long− centerLong ≤ side∧
read(gps.Lat)− centerLat > side∧
read(gps.Long)− centerLong > side
and EnterArea is a macro for the boolean test:
gps.Lat− centerLat > side∧
gps.Long− centerLong > side∧
read(gps.Lat)− centerLat ≤ side∧
read(gps.Long)− centerLong ≤ side
Example 10. Consider following app. When the lights are
turned on the app should brew coffee and set the heater to 22
degrees. Suppose to have three services: ligth, managing the
lights, coffeeM, managing the coffee machine, and heater,
managing the heater. The app is formalized as follows:










Example 11. Imagine to have the following app. If a water
leak is detected, then the app should shut off the main
water supply valve. We assume two services: leakDetect,
reporting whether there is a water leak or not, and mainValve,
managing the main water valve. The app is formalized as
follows:








Example 12. Imagine to have an Lamp1, such that if the floor
lamp is turned on and the home is in sleep mode, then the
app should turn off the lamp after 5 minutes. We assume
three services: flamp, managing the floor lamp, homeMode,
reporting the home mode, and alarm, controlling the burglar
alarm. The app is formalized as follows:
Lamp1[flampRW; homeModeRfixX • listen(flamp;homeMode);P12 ]
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Example 13. Imagine to have a second app, Lamp2, such that
if the floor lamp is turned on, and some object is moving, and
it is midnight, and the lamp is tunred on for more than 10
minutes, then the burglar alarm should be fired. We assume
three services: flamp, managing the floor lamp, motion,
reporting whether something is moving or not, and time,
reporting the current time. The app is formalized as follows:










if (cond) then {





where cond is the following boolean test:
flamp.state = On ∧ motion = yes ∧ time.H = 0 = time.M.
Example 14. Imagine to have an app Forward, forwarding
messages from the e-mail address emailA to the e-mail
address emailB. The app is formalized as follows:







Let us now comment on potential interactions and or
interferences between the apps defined above.
Semantic vs. syntax-based interactions: According to Def-
inition 3, the apps Welcome and Leak do not interact with
each other, since for every G ∈ S we have:
• 〈G,L⊥〉  Welcome ‖ Leak ≈Hw Leak
• 〈G,L⊥〉  Welcome ‖ Leak ≈Hl Welcome
where Hw = upd(Welcome) and Hl = upd(Leak).
However, if we add also the app SmokeAlarm, defined in
Example 2, then we do have an interaction. In fact, there exists
G ∈ S such that:
〈G,L⊥〉  SmokeAlarm ‖ Welcome ‖ Leak ≈Hs Welcome ‖ Leak
where Hs = upd(SmokeAlarm). Here, the app SmokeAlarm
may interact with the compound system Welcome ‖ Leak.
Intuitively, when some smoke is detected the app SmokeAlarm
turns the lights on. As a consequence, the app Welcome is
triggered: the app brews a coffee and set the heater to 22
degrees.
According to Definition 6, this interaction can be captured
syntactically as: SmokeAlarm  Welcome ‖ Leak does
not hold because act(SmokeAlarm) = {alarm, lights},
trg(Welcome ‖ Leak) = {lights, leakDetect}, and hence
act(SmokeAlarm)) ∩ trg(Welcome ‖ Leak) = ∅.
Interactions under dependencies: According to Defini-
tion 3, the app Lamp1 is noninteracting with the app Lamp2,
even if there is an obvious interplay between them. This
lack in Definition 3 is due to the fact we cannot express
that the action OffDelay5 turns flamp.state to Off after 5
minutes. This can be fixed by using a dependency policy
Δ
def
= {(flamp.ctrl, flamp.state)}. In fact, according to
Definition 7, there exists G ∈ S such that:
〈G,L⊥〉  Lamp1 ‖ Lamp2 Δ≈H1 Lamp2
with H1
def
= {Lamp1:flamp.ctrl!v ∈ A | v ∈ Value}. Intu-
itively, if the app Lamp1 turns off the lights then the app Lamp2
cannot be triggered. Again, this interaction can be captured
syntactically, via Definition 8, as Lamp1 stackrelΔ Lamp2
does not hold because {flamp.ctrl, flamp.state} ⊆
clo(Δ, act(Lamp1)), {flamp.state} ⊆ trg(Lamp2), and
hence clo(Δ, act(Lamp1)) ∩ trg(Lamp2) = ∅.
Interference and noninterference: Suppose that the email
account A, associated to the address emailA, is confidential,
i.e., Σ(emailA) = H, while the email account B, associated
to the address emailB, is public, i.e., Σ(emailB) = L. For
instance, emails associated to the account A can be red only
by one, privileged, administrator while emails associated to
the account B can be freely read by any user.
Clearly, the system S
def
= Area ‖ Forward is not secure as we
have a confidentiality leak from emailA to emailB. Indeed,
it is not hard to find two L-equivalent global stores G and G′
such that 〈G,L⊥〉S ≈tiHL 〈G′,L⊥〉S. Again, we can capture
this interference by syntactic means: the system S cannot be
typed by our security type system because the process P14
running within the applet Forward is not typable. In fact, when
building the derivation tree for the typing, we have to type





Γ2, for Γ1 = [emailA → H , emailB → L , . . .]
and Γ2 = [emailA → H , emailB → H , . . .]. But then, the
subsequent command update(emailB) cannot be typed, since
the current typing of emailB is H while the initial typing of
emailB is Σ(emailB) = L. Thus, the app Forward is not
typable and, in turn, the parallel composition S is not typable.
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